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Abstract
This paper investigates tenants’ willingness to pay (WTP) for energy effi-
ciency in the private rented housing sector. Using data from Aberdeen city
and Shire in Scotland between the third quarter of 2013 and the second quar-
ter of 2017, rent premiums of 2-11% associated with more energy efficient
dwellings are found, and the magnitudes of these premiums are considerable
compared to those of other physical attributes. Such premiums however,
are significantly reduced during economic recession, suggesting that tenants’
WTP for energy efficiency varies under different economic conditions. From
a methodological perspective, the study uses a multilevel model, where the
unobservable neighbourhood and age effects are approximated. Our results
implicate that although tenants’ WTP for more energy efficient is present,
there still might be a need for public strategy to facilitate the improvement
of energy performance in the private rented sector.
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1. Background
Targets were set by the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions substantially.1 As greenhouse gas emissions from
the housing sector account for around a quarter of Scotland’s total emissions
(The Scottish Government, 2012b), making homes more energy efficient has
been a key focus of the government policy. While new housing constructions
are subject to building standards, older buildings in the private sector have no
regulatory requirement on their energy efficiency performance. Particularly,
the private rented sector (PRS) is often perceived to be the least energy
efficient among all tenures in many markets in Europe and North America
(Carroll et al., 2016; Kholodilin et al., 2016; Hope and Booth, 2014; Wilkinson
and Goodacre, 2002), despite its rapid growth in size and importance (Hope
and Booth, 2014).
One of the main hurdles to energy efficiency improvement in the PRS is
the landlord-tenant split-incentive problem (Wilkinson and Goodacre, 2002;
Barten, 2005; Bird and Herna´ndez, 2012; Gillingham et al., 2012; Wood et al.,
2012; Hope and Booth, 2014): landlords have the incentive to supply ac-
commodation at the lowest possible cost, but not necessarily the highest
efficiency, as tenants tend to be responsible for energy associated costs. Ten-
ants have the incentive to make their accommodation more energy efficient,
however the upfront cost of improvement may be too high and/or the pay-
back period may be too long if renting is only intended for a short term (Bird
and Herna´ndez, 2012). It has been argued that landlords often are not able to
recoup investments from tenants (Schleich and Gruber, 2008), and tenants’
lack of willingness to pay (WTP) is usually a result of market failures due
to information asymmetry and uncertainty (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012;
Davis, 2011; Levinson and Niemann, 2004; Schleich and Gruber, 2008).
It was generally assumed that tenants were unable to fully assess dwellings’
energy efficiency levels due to information asymmetry, thus they were unlikely
to offer a rent premium that would fully compensate the landlords’ invest-
ment in energy improvement. In the last decade however, many European
housing markets saw improved information transparency on dwellings’ energy
performance as a result of the requirement of Energy Performance Certifi-
1Targets are set to reduce Scotland’s greenhouse gas emission by at least 42% by 2020
and 80% by 2050.
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cate (EPC)2. Wood et al. (2012) suggest that with well-informed tenants and
sufficient awareness among them, landlords with more energy efficient build-
ings should capture a rent premium, which should offset any split-incentive
effect. Another factor that influences households’ WTP for energy efficiency
is uncertainty. Hassett and Metcalf (1993) find that households may apply a
high discount rate to future energy savings if there is uncertainty over future
conservation savings. Uncertainty could also be related to potential changes
in energy prices; or/and it could be a result of the relatively short rental
relationship (Kholodilin et al., 2016).
Empirically, a number of studies (Chegut et al., 2013; Eichholtz et al.,
2010; Fuerst et al., 2013; Fuerst and McAllister, 2011a,b; Kok and Jennen,
2012; Wiley et al., 2010; Pivo and Fisher, 2010; Reichardt et al., 2012) find
significant rent premiums associated with energy efficiency, suggesting that
there is a degree of WTP for energy efficient buildings in a number of commer-
cial real estate markets. Gabe and Rehm (2014) and Fuerst and McAllister
(2011c) on the other hand, show no rent premiums in the commercial real
estate sector. Empirical evidence on the PRS is scarce. Kholodilin et al.
(2016) find statistically significant WTP in the Berlin PRS, the magnitude
of such WTP however is very small. Hyland et al. (2013) also show that
energy efficiency has a positive effect on rental prices of properties in the
Irish housing markets. However, arguably the study has little control over
dwelling quality and location specifics. Using a Discrete Choice Experiment,
Carroll et al. (2016) suggest that renters value energy efficiency. Particularly,
the WTP for efficiency improvements is considerably higher at the lower end
of the efficiency scale.
Notably, most of these studies use data with a relatively short time frame,
and those that cover a longer time period do not consider the potential
effects of market conditions, with the exception of Hyland et al. (2013), where
the authors find stronger effect of energy rating in the rental market when
market conditions are worse. The authors however do not provide further
explanation to the findings, and it is unclear whether these differences in
WTP are statistically significant. On the contrary, Wilkinson and Goodacre
(2002) argue that market conditions are unlikely to play an important role:
2In Scotland, since January 2009 all private landlords are required to provide EPC when
lease to a new tenant under the Under the Energy Performance of Building (Scotland)
Regulations 2008.
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if the demand for rented properties is high, landlords are likely to obtain high
rental income regardless whether or not they spend on improvement. If the
demand is low, landlords may lose out by charging higher rent related to the
more energy efficient improvements. The split-incentive problem is therefore
likely to be present regardless market conditions. These studies raise further
questions regarding the split-incentive issue in the PRS, thus more evidence
is needed to analyse tenants’ WTP for energy efficient buildings in the private
sector.
Studies in psychology, cognitive science and experimental economics have
shown that when feeling stressed, distracted and under pressure or scarcity
(financial, emotional, time, etc.), people make decisions differently (Loewen-
stein, 2000; Kenrick et al., 2009). For example, low-income households are
more likely to take out short-term loans with prohibitively high interest rate
to pay off immediate daily expenses (Bair, 2005); people facing immediate
deadlines tend to only think of the task at hand (Karau and Kelly, 1992);
in economic recession, people from a low socio-economic background tend to
be more short-term minded and prefer to spend now than to invest in the
future (Griskevicius et al., 2013). Overall, research has shown that scarcity
impairs people’s cognitive capacity to make calculated rational decisions, but
frames their mind in the context where the source of stress or distraction is
salient. Thus, they tend to focus on the pressing issues while ignoring others
(Shah et al., 2012, 2015). Studies also find that during recent economic reces-
sion, consumers bypass expensive eco-products such as hybrid cars3 or trade
down to cheaper alternatives (Flatters and Willmott, 2009); and economic
issues replace environmental issue as more immediate concerns for consumers
(Downs, 1972; Lipsey, 1977; Corrado and Ross, 1990; Kalafatis et al., 1999).
In the light of above, we argue that during stressful times, tenants are
likely to focus on the immediate needs and ignore the potential payoffs in the
future, thus their demand for energy efficient buildings is likely to decrease
relative to other more immediate requirements of housing, such as the neces-
sary space needed.4 Instead of paying a premium for energy efficiency, they
may save energy costs through other channels (such as heating one room
rather than the whole property; or wearing more layers of clothing). In addi-
3Hybrid cars draw a close parallel to more energy efficient properties: they seem to
cost a premium, but will save users on fuel/energy bill in the long run.
4For example, the need for (minimum) space needs to be addressed regardless if the
household is in stressful condition.
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tion, the higher level of uncertainty during economic downturn would result
a higher discount rate applied to the future energy savings. Renters also
have the advantage to change their residences relatively easily, therefore can
respond more quickly to changes in economic and employment conditions.
Based on this, this paper first examines whether a rent premium for
energy efficient dwelling is present. We then test the hypothesis that renters’
WTP for energy efficient dwellings reduces during economic recession. The
paper also highlights whether the WTP for other housing attributes differs
during economic downturns to demonstrate the potential differences between
energy efficiency and other housing attributes. Transaction data in the PRS
of Aberdeen city and Shire in Scotland is applied to test the hypotheses.
The region provides an appropriate case study area, as its housing market
performance fluctuated dramatically in the last five years as a result of the
peak of oil price in 2013 and the subsequent fall in 2014.
2. Case study area
Located in the northeast of Scotland, Aberdeen city and Shire are the
home to more than 400,000 residents. Due to its proximity to the North Sea
oil fields, the region is also a hub for many large oil and gas companies and
their supporting services, thus earns its name as the “Europe’s oil capital”.
The local economy is heavily reliant on the oil and gas sector: it accounts for
more than 20% of the employment and more than half of the total turnover
(Aberdeen City Council, 2015). As a result of the recent turmoil in oil prices,
Aberdeen has suffered substantial job losses from the energy sector (Ambrose,
2016). For those fortunate enough to keep their jobs, the level of pay and
benefit is no comparison to the pre-crises level (Chester, 2016).The downturn
in the gas and oil sector has inevitably affected other sectors in the region,
especially the private housing market. Mortgage arrears doubled the national
level in 2016 (Ambrose, 2016), and as illustrated in Figure 1, both rental and
price level saw a significant decline from 2014Q3, a few months lagging behind
the start of the oil price slump. Notably, the CPI index of electricity, gas
and misc only shows a slight decrease since 2014Q3, suggesting that there
has been little change in energy price for consumers. Thus any change in
tenants’ WTP for energy efficient buildings is unlikely to be a direct result
of the small changes in energy price.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
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3. Data
Transaction data of private residential property leases from the Aberdeen
Solicitors Property Centre (ASPC) was obtained on the basis of a non-
disclosure agreement between the University of Aberdeen and the ASPC.
The datasets record properties marketed as “to let” in the housing market
area defined by the local authorities in Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire (see
Figure 2) from 1985Q3 to date (2017Q3).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Due to the availability of EPC ratings (details see Section 3.2), lease
data includes 13,197 properties advertised through the centre between the
second quarter of 2013 and the third quarter of 2017. The dataset includes
information on the listing date and leased date of each property and achieved
rent. Physical attributes such as property type, number of public rooms,
number of bedrooms, whether the property has central heating, garden and
garage(s) are available in the dataset. Locational attributes are also included
(details see Section 3.1). The variables used for the analysis are listed in
Table 1, and the summary statistics of the lease data variables are presented
in Table 2. Notably, year quarter dummies have less observations, as some
properties were still on the market at the time of this analysis. Variable rent
also has less observations due to the fact that over 3,600 properties were
withdrawn from the listing.
[Insert Table 1, 2 here]
One major advantage of the ASPC lease dataset is that both asking rent
and achieved rent are recorded. Achieved rent is used to evaluate tenants’
WTP for energy efficient buildings. This can avoid the potential problems
associated with using estimated market rent or asking rents highlighted by
Gabe and Rehm (2014) - such variables measure expectations but not the
outcomes (WTP). The data also shows that since 2014Q3, there were an
increasing number of properties that were leased at a price below the asking
rent, and the proportion of withdrawn properties also increased substantially
from a few dozens in a quarter to a few hundreds in a quarter. This further
illustrates the severity of the economic impact on the RPS.
6
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Because the ASPC only captures rented properties when they are ad-
vertised through the centre5, the observations in the dataset only consist of
a sub-sample of the total RPS stock in Aberdeen city and Shire6. We do
not anticipate sample size issues, other studies on the PRS, such as the rent
trend study by The Scottish Government (2015), use samples of similar size
for Aberdeen area.
3.1. Spatial variables and potential omitted variable problems
One advantage of the ASPC data is that it includes multiple measures
of location. This allows us to carry out a number of spatial controls in the
hedonic regression models to avoid the potential bias in the estimation of
the effect of energy efficiency measures in the absence of such control. For
example, in Fuerst and McAllister (2011a), there was no specific control for
the location of each property within the region. As a result, the authors
suggest that “a mere location price effect may be erroneously attributed to
energy performance” (page. 6611), if buildings with different levels of energy
performance are not randomly distributed spatially.
Another concern of using hedonic models is the potential bias caused by
the omitted variables. One variable that would be closely related to the EPC
rating but not available in our dataset is the age of the property. To address
this issue, we allow potential age effect to be reflected at a higher level within
each full 7-digit Postcodes7, based on the assumption that dwellings with the
same postcode are very likely to be constructed during the same time period.8
In addition, the dataset has a dummy variable Newbuild to indicate whether
a property is newly constructed, which allows further control for age.
3.2. EPC ratings
As mentioned earlier, since January 2009, all private landlords are re-
quired to provide an EPC when leasing their properties to a new tenant un-
der the Energy Performance of Building (Scotland) Regulations 2008. Since
5These are listings through estate agents that are often operated by solicitors. Leasing
through other channels (such as Gumtree) are not captured by the ASPC.
6It is estimated by the local authorities that around 14,000 households in Aberdeen
city and 10,000 in Aberdeenshire lived in private rented accommodation in 2015.
7On average, there are 15 properties in each postcode, we allow random effect at post-
code level, and this is discussed in detail in section 4.
8As new developments or the conversion of existing premises may result in the need for
new postal addresses.
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our analysis uses data from 2013, we do not have the sample selection issue
raised in other papers.9
An EPC report contains information about the property’s energy use, its
typical energy costs and recommendations about how to reduce energy use.
The certificate also gives the property an energy efficiency rating from A
(most efficient) to G (least efficient). An EPC can only be produced by an
expert who needs to be a member of an approved Government Accreditation
scheme. The assessor collects energy related features10 during the inspection,
and the data is analysed by computer software developed by the government.
The rating system uses information on the performance of the building itself
such as heating and lighting, therefore provides an energy efficiency rating
for the property itself rather than depending on the occupier. The ASPC
data started to record EPC ratings from the third quarter of 2013 for most
properties.11
The Scottish House Condition Survey shows that 40% of dwellings in the
sample had an EPC between A and C, 40% had an EPC D, and 20% below
D in 2010.12 The ASPC data shows similar proportions: a slightly higher
proportion (43%) of leased properties rated C and above, 33% of properties
had an EPC D, and 24% below D (See Table 2).
4. Models
In line with existing studies (Eichholtz et al., 2010; Brounen and Kok,
2011; Fuerst et al., 2013), we use hedonic regressions to examine the relations
between rents and energy performance. There are four specifications for the
models used in this study. The first specification is a baseline log-linear
hedonic model (Model 1) which is presented in Eq. 1:
log(Renti) = αi + βXi + γGeocodei + i , (1)
9In a market where energy efficiency measures are not mandatory, or if the owners do
not have to provide EPC or equivalents when advertising, it is possible that the data is
subject to selection bias (Carroll et al., 2016; Hyland et al., 2013; Kholodilin et al., 2016).
10This typically include information on property type, age, type of construction, prop-
erty dimensions, room and water heating systems, insulation levels, windows and glazing
types, and types of lighting.
11Missing values are due to errors in data recording.
12The results are presented in The Scottish Government (2012a), housing tenure is not
differentiated in the report.
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where log(Renti) is the natural logarithm of the realised annual rent for
property i. Xi is a vector of the explanatory variables for the property at-
tributes, including Numpublic, Numbedrooms, Numbathrooms, Heating,
Cloakroom, Garage, Garden, Parking, Newbuild, TOM , Furnish,
NondeMulti, NondeSing, DetaMulti, DetaSing, FlatMulti, FlatSing,
Y ear Quarter (see Table 1 for variable names and their descriptions). β
is a vector of parameters to be estimated for the physical attributes. To
control for the location of properties, Geocodei is included. It consists of
the standardised13 spatial coordinates and their cross products. Specifically,
these are x, x2, ..., x5, y, y2, ..., y5, xy, xy2,..., xy5. The inclusion of the geo-
graphic coordinates is to smooth the unobservable geographic differences of
properties (Jackson, 1979; Bracke, 2015; Bracke et al., 2017). Further dis-
cussion of this spatial specification and robustness test results are presented
in Appendix. i is the random error which is the stochastic disturbance term
from a normal distribution of N(0, σ2).
In Model 2 (Eq. 2), the EPC binary variables are included to indicate
the energy performance of the property. If the estimated coefficients are
statistically significant, the model then captures rental premiums associated
with energy performance.14
log(Renti) = αi + βXi + γGeocodei + δEPCi + i . (2)
Fuerst and McAllister (2011c) suggest that the estimated coefficients of
the EPC ratings may be dependent on which EPC rating variables are omit-
ted in regression (in our regression models, we omitted EPC E), thus sensi-
tivity tests are conducted using different reference EPC rating variables.15
To take into account the local economic crisis (as shown in the third
quarter of 2014 in Figure 1), a structural break of 2014Q3 is included in the
analysis. Particularly, dummy variable 2014Q3 is interacted with all physi-
cal attribute measures and EPC binary variables, and these interactive terms
are included in Model 3 (Eq. 3). If the estimated interactive coefficients are
13The derivation from its mean, divided by its standard derivation:
lat− µlat
σlat
,
lng − µlng
σlng
.
14Due to small sample size, EPC A is combined with B as one rating. E is chosen as
the reference rating.
15The results are available from authors upon request.
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statistically significant, the model then captures the additional changes of
rental premium associated with housing characteristics and energy perfor-
mance after the break.
log(Renti) = αi+βXi+γGeocodei+δEPCi+τ [Break×Xi]+η[Break×EPCi]+i .
(3)
where Break is an indicative variable for the oil crisis break, specified as 1
after 2014Q3 and 0 otherwise.16 τ and η denote the coefficients on physical
attributes and energy efficiency ratings during economic downturn, respec-
tively.
As mentioned previously, information on dwelling age is not completely
available in the ASPC dataset, and full postcodes are used in this study to
control for dwelling age based on the assumption that dwellings in the same
postcodes were developed around the same time. One could argue that there
may be differences in rents within each postcode due to the (unobserved)
differences in the age of the dwellings as well as the neighbourhood effects
embedded each postcode. Neighbourhood effect could be a result of school
quality, the provision of amenities, households’ characteristics such as income,
education and employment, and so on. This effect may cause price variation
in the housing market, but is difficult to observe/quantify. Bracke et al.
(2017) allow fixed effect at street level to disentangle neighbourhood effect
from other features. We allow similar control at postcode level. In other
words, each postcode, j, may have a different intercept term αj. Further,
the implicit price of a particular housing attribute expressed in Model 2,
may vary among the postcodes. Therefore, following Gelfand et al. (2007),
Orford (2002) and Liu and Roberts (2012), the following multilevel model is
estimated for each of the postcode:
log(Renti,j) = αj +
∑
θkZk,i,j + [µα,j + µβ,k,j + i,j] , (4)
where
i = 1, 2, ..., n properties (level one of the multilevel model);
j = 1, 2, ..., n postcodes (level two of the multilevel model with properties
16The break is identified ex post and tested by Chow test on rental index and crude
oil price index. A number of break points between 2014Q3 and 2015Q2 were also trialled
for the analysis, based on structural breaks in the average TOM (time on the market -
see Table 1), and the sudden increase in the number of withdrawn properties. Empirical
results are very similar to that of applying 2014Q3 as the structural break.
10
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
nested within each postcode);
k = 1, 2, ..., n attributes.
For simplicity, Zk,i,j denotes all housing structural and locational at-
tributes, and break interactive terms (a combination of X, Geocode, EPC
and interactive variables in Eq. 3).
The model in Eq. 4 allows for the existence of both random intercept
effects and random slope effects. In particular,
αj = α + µα,j ,
where αj is the average constant for postcode j, and is a function of the
average constant across the postcodes plus a varying difference µα,j for each
postcode. Similarly,
βk,j = β + µβ,k,j ,
indicating for each individual coefficient, the slope term is seen as an average
slope at postcode level plus a variation from postcode to postcode. The
bracketed term in Eq. 4 captures the random elements.
The relationship between the two types of random effects can be further
explored by creating a correlation:
corr(µα,j, µβ,k,j) =
cov(µα,j, µβ,k,j)
σµα,jσµβ,k,j
The model 4 contains four random disturbance: σ for level one which
is the individual property level. σµα,j , σµβ,k,j , and cov(µα,j, µβ,k,j) for level
two postcode level. We also carry out some robustness tests with regard to
location measures in the model, these are included the Appendix.
The ASPC data is then applied to all four models and results are pre-
sented in the next section.
5. Results
Table 3, 4 and 5 show hedonic regression results for rents under each
model specification. All models have an explanatory power of around 80%.
In Model 1, most of the estimated effects of house attributes on rent are as
expected (for example, an additional public room, a bedroom, a cloak room
or a bathroom yields significantly positive coefficients on annual rents), and
the geographic coordinates also show significant effects in smoothing the
11
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unobservable geographic differences of properties.17 However, the negative
effect of detached type of properties, compared to non-detached properties,
and the positive coefficient of TOM are difficult to interpret. Time dummy
variables as control for market conditions show some level of fluctuations in
rental level over the time period.
[Insert Table 3, 4 and 5 here]
Model 2 includes EPC ratings, and the results on physical, locational and
market condition measures are very consistent with those in Model 1, apart
from a noticeable reduction in the magnitude of “Newbuild”, suggesting that
without the measures of EPC ratings, it is difficult to distinguish the effects
of energy efficiency of being a new dwelling from other perceived quality
associated with the variable. Regarding the coefficients of EPC ratings in
Model 2, rent premiums and discounts are found to be present. For example,
compared with an E rated property (the default), A/B rated properties are
leased at a premium of 8%, and C rated properties have a premium of 1.6%.
Less energy efficient buildings such as those with G ratings were leased at a
discount. There are no statistical differences in rents between E and D rated
buildings and E and F ratings.
The coefficients of the interactive variables are highlighted in Model 3
and Model 4. Because Model 4 allows further control of dwelling age and
neighbourhood effects at postcode level (indicated by the significant σ and χ2
statistics), this further confirms the presence of such hierarchical structure
within the housing market. Our discussion here focuses on the results from
model 4. With regard to the physical attributes, most characteristics yield
similar coefficients as in Model 2. Notably, the effect of TOM is no longer
positive, but also statistically insignificant. Furnished properties yield much
larger coefficient in Model 4, and there is little difference among rental levels
with regard to dwelling type.
Turning attention to the magnitudes and significance of the EPC vari-
ables, some coefficients of EPC ratings in Model 4 are larger and more sta-
tistically significant compared to those in Model 2, confirming the need for
allowing control for age and neighbourhood effect. Given the average annual
rent of £9832 in our sample, the associated rent increase for upgrading from
17Most coefficients of spatial coordinates and their higher orders are statistically signif-
icant at 1%, they can be provided upon request.
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E rating to D is £295 per annum, and £393 and £737 per annum respec-
tively for upgrading to C rating or A/B rating. To put this in perspective,
we investigate EPC reports of current two bedroom properties that on the
market. Typically, a property of EPC E that has the potential to upgrade
to C would save around £400 per annum on heating alone (based on gas
central heating). Discounts on F and G rated properties are also present
and statistically significant at 2.7% and 6.8% respectively. These premi-
ums/discounts are of similar size to the findings in Carroll et al. (2016). The
premiums/discounts are also progressive, suggesting that the market is able
to distinguish between the different level of EPC ratings, so an upgrade of
the property energy performance at any level would be rewarded with a rent
premium. It is also notable that compared to other attributes of the property,
the effect of energy efficiency on rent is non-trivial.
One could argue that WTP for energy efficiency might be sensitive to
dwelling sizes - with small dwellings, renters are less sensitive to energy per-
formance than renters of larger dwellings, where the energy cost could be
relatively large. To further test this, we included a further dummy variable
- Large in Model 4, to indicate larger properties with four and more than
four bedrooms18, and Large is subsequently interacted with EPC ratings.
The result is presented in Appendix Table A.7. It shows that most of the
interactive terms yield insignificant coefficients but Large × EPCD. This
suggests that tenants of larger properties are not more sensitive to energy
performance than tenants of smaller properties in our sample.
To see the potential market condition effect, the coefficients of the EPC
ratings should be interpreted along with the interactive terms in Model 4.
For example, compared to EPC E rating, rent premiums saw 3%, 2%, and 1.6
%19 reduction for A/B, C, and D rated properties respectively since 2014Q3.
In other words, compared to properties with an EPC rating of E, rental
premiums are smaller for D and above rated properties in economic downturn,
whereas the discounts for lower rated properties remain unchanged. These
results are opposite to the findings in Hyland et al. (2013), but confirm
our hypothesis that tenants are less willing to pay for more energy efficient
18We also tried three bedrooms as an approximation for larger properties, and the results
are very similar to using four bedroom house as an indication of larger properties.
19These coefficients are significant at 10% level. Although arguably, this significance
is relatively low compared to other coefficients, the results are robust with regard to the
choice of structural break point that mentioned in footnote 16.
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buildings during economic downturn (at least for properties with an EPC
rating of E or above). In addition, all but one coefficients of the structural
break interacted with bedroom and public room variables are statistically
insignificant, indicating that tenants’ WTP for the necessaries such as the
minimum space is not influenced by the economic conditions.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Split-incentives have been perceived as one of the major hurdles of improv-
ing energy performance of dwellings in the PRS. While the existing studies
tend to compare energy expenditure between tenants and owner-occupiers to
indicate the presence of the issue, we argue that a more direct way to inves-
tigate the presence of split-incentive issue is through the study of tenants’
WTP for more energy efficient homes. Such WTP could be in the form of
rent premium. In the light of psychological studies, this study provides a
new conceptualisation of the factors that would influence households’ WTP
for energy efficient buildings, and considers the potential changes in tenants’
behaviours during economic downturn.
Consistent with other studies in the PRS (such as Kholodilin et al. (2016),
Hyland et al. (2013) and Carroll et al. (2016)), our empirical results generally
show strong evidence of such premiums in the rented sector in northeast
Scotland. Our energy efficiency premium however is larger compared to that
in other studies: compared to properties with an EPC E, rent premiums
range from 2-11% for properties with better energy performance, and a 3-
7% discount for properties with lower energy efficiency across four models.
The magnitudes of these premiums are considerable in comparison to those
of other typical physical attributes. These rent premiums also seem to be
substantial relative to typical retrofits costs (for example, an upgrade to
new double glazed windows typically costs approximate £1000 each, loft
insulation costs between £200-£300 for a typical house, and wall insulation
costs around £200). Also, the progressive premium suggests that the market
is able to distinguish between different levels of energy performance, so an
upgrade of the property at almost any level will be rewarded with a rent
premium.
Compared to other studies on WTP in the PRS, our study specifically
considers behaviour changes under economic constraints. It is important to
highlight that in line with psychological theories, such WTP for energy per-
formance is significantly reduced among E and above rated properties since
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later 2014, when the regional economy suffered from the dramatic downturn
in oil price. Our results further confirm that while rent premiums on energy
efficiency is reduced, premiums on additional bedrooms and public room
remain more or less the same, suggesting that during economic downturn,
people indeed focus on necessaries, and may seek alternative ways to save
energy cost.
This study confirms that the split-incentives problem is a complex is-
sue: while tenants are generally responsive to EPC ratings, and landlords
can potentially reap the benefits from the investment in energy efficiency
in rents, they may less be able to do so during economic downturns. Thus
although there is little financial reason for under-investment during normal
economic conditions, landlords may fear the reduced/lack of WTP for energy
efficiency when the market is at trough. In addition, other hurdles related to
financial constraints (for example, insufficient lump sum available to carry
out the improvements) and/or limited access to credit could also limit land-
lords’ ability to improve energy performance. Moreover, some properties are
structurally challenging to be upgraded to a higher EPC level (the “hard
to treat” properties). These are important considerations for policy makers
when implementing interventions on energy performance of dwellings in the
sector. For example, financial incentives may be more appropriate in improv-
ing energy performance during economic downturns. Similar suggestions can
be found in cleaner car studies, such as Poder and He (2017), where it was
suggested that consumers’ actual WTP for cleaner cars is unlikely to be suf-
ficient for the development of the market, thus there is a need for a public
strategy to facilitate the commercial development of cleaner vehicles.20
Finally, in terms of the modeling technique, our models show the impor-
tance to allow for hierarchical structure that may be present in the housing
data. The benefits of the two level modeling also include allowing approxi-
mation of the age and neighbourhood effect that otherwise would be omitted
from the analysis.
We also recognise some of the potential shortcomings in this study. In
terms of data, some of the characteristics of the dwellings are approximated
due to data limitation. While this allows for some control for age and size
20Poder and He (2017) further give an example of such strategy - the “bonus-malus”
system implemented in France at the beginning of 2008, which subsidised the purchase of
environmentally friendly cars and reduced the taxation of these cars substantially as well.
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of the property, they are not precisely measured. For example, we do not
observe if a property has recently been renovated even if it might have been
an old building. Our further test results on the sensitivity of EPC premiums
among large properties compared to smaller dwellings needs further inves-
tigation. It might be that energy consumptions are better managed with
new technologies (such as smart meters) that dwelling size no longer makes
a significant difference. We use number of rooms and dwelling type as a con-
trol for property size, but we do not observe the actual size of the property.
However, by checking the adverts for recent rented properties on the mar-
ket, it appears that the room sizes of rented properties do not seem to vary
substantially (for example, double bedrooms tend to be around 13 square
meters, living rooms tends to be around 16 square meters).
Another limitation is that the status/condition of the building is not
indicated in the dataset, although some of the existing variables may capture
this to a certain extent, for example, we know whether a property is old or
new, furnish or nonfurnished, has central heating or not; the status/condition
of the dwellings may play an influential role if can be quantified and included
in the model. Because the dataset only shows dwellings that were leased via
estate agents (often operated by solicitors), who charge management fees,
and properties are maintained regularly; it may be reasonable to assume
that dwellings are maintained relatively well (compared to those that are
leased directly from landlords, tenants’ rights seem to be more protected if
renting via established agents).
Our data is unbalanced (1 years pre-crisis and 3 years during crisis), as
further stage of the property cycle emerges, we will be able to expand the data
to capture such changes in market condition. With regard to the measure
of energy performance, there have been debates of the adequacy of EPC,
nevertheless it is the mandatory and most available measure for all dwellings
in Scotland. From a behaviour perspective, it is possible that properties
with higher energy performance are also maintained by more attentive and
responsible landlords or home-owners. Such information is not available for
our analysis, and we will leave it for future research.
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8. Figures and Tables
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Figure 1: Aberdeen house price and rent vs. the oil price and the electricity &
gas price: The rent and sale price are the cross-sectional average of all properties. The
oil price is the crude oil price in dollars. The electricity and gas price is the UK CPI index
of electricity, gas and misc. energy in pounds. Both oil price and electricity & gas price
are quoted from Datastream.
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Figure 2: Housing Market Areas Aberdeen city and Aberdeenshire
24
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
T
ab
le
1:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
s
of
va
ri
ab
le
s
th
at
ar
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
e
h
ed
on
ic
m
o
d
el
V
a
ri
a
b
le
N
a
m
e
D
e
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
h
li
n
e
R
en
t
A
ch
ie
ve
d
an
n
u
al
re
n
t
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
x
S
p
at
ia
l
co
o
rd
in
at
e
(l
at
it
u
d
e)
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
af
te
r
st
an
d
ar
d
is
at
io
n
x
2
−
x
5
H
ig
h
er
or
d
er
s
(f
ro
m
2
to
5)
of
th
e
st
an
d
ar
d
is
ed
la
ti
tu
d
e
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
y
S
p
at
ia
l
co
o
rd
in
at
e
(l
on
gi
tu
d
es
)
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
af
te
r
st
an
d
ar
d
is
at
io
n
y
2
−
y
5
H
ig
h
er
or
d
er
s
(f
ro
m
2
to
5)
of
th
e
st
an
d
ar
d
is
ed
lo
n
gi
tu
d
e
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
x
y
−
x
5
y
P
ro
d
u
ct
s
of
h
ig
h
er
or
d
er
s
(f
ro
m
2
to
5)
of
st
an
d
ar
d
is
ed
la
ti
tu
d
e
an
d
lo
n
gi
tu
d
e
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
P
os
tc
od
e
F
u
ll
p
os
tc
o
d
e
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
Z
on
e
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
Z
on
e
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
N
u
m
p
u
bl
ic
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
u
b
li
c
ro
om
s
(0
,
1,
2,
3,
4
or
m
or
e
th
an
4)
;
in
cl
u
d
in
g
lo
u
n
ge
,
li
v
in
g
ro
om
,
d
ra
w
in
g
ro
om
,
fa
m
il
y
ro
om
,
k
it
ch
en
,
et
c.
A
st
u
d
io
fl
at
h
as
0
p
u
b
li
c
ro
om
s
N
u
m
be
d
ro
om
s
N
u
m
b
er
of
b
ed
ro
om
s
(0
,
1,
2,
3,
4
or
m
or
e
th
an
4)
,
a
st
u
d
io
fl
at
h
as
0
b
ed
ro
om
s
N
u
m
ba
th
ro
om
s
N
u
m
b
er
of
b
a
th
ro
om
s
(0
to
5)
.
0
in
d
ic
at
es
sh
ow
er
-r
o
om
(s
)
H
ea
ti
n
g
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
h
as
ce
n
tr
al
h
ea
ti
n
g
C
lo
a
k
ro
om
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
h
as
cl
oa
k
ro
om
(s
)
G
a
ra
g
e
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
a
te
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
h
as
ga
ra
ge
(s
)
G
a
rd
en
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
a
te
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
h
as
ga
rd
en
(s
)
P
a
rk
in
g
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
h
as
a
d
ri
v
ew
ay
or
on
st
re
et
p
ar
k
in
g
N
ew
bu
il
d
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
n
ew
ly
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
T
O
M
T
im
e
on
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
in
w
ee
k
s,
co
m
p
u
te
d
as
th
e
d
u
ra
ti
on
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
li
st
in
g
d
at
e
an
d
so
ld
/l
ea
se
d
d
at
e
N
on
d
eM
u
lt
i
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
a
n
on
-d
et
ac
h
ed
h
ou
se
w
it
h
m
or
e
th
an
on
e
fl
o
or
(b
a
se
li
n
e)
N
on
d
eS
in
g
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
a
n
on
-d
et
ac
h
ed
b
u
n
ga
lo
w
D
et
a
M
u
lt
i
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
a
d
et
ac
h
ed
h
ou
se
w
it
h
m
or
e
th
an
on
e
fl
o
or
D
et
a
S
in
g
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
a
d
et
ac
h
ed
b
u
n
ga
lo
w
F
la
tT
op
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
a
to
p
fl
o
or
fl
at
F
la
tM
id
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
a
fl
at
te
d
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
b
et
w
ee
n
gr
ou
n
d
fl
o
or
an
d
to
p
fl
o
or
F
la
tG
ro
u
d
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
a
gr
ou
n
d
fl
o
or
fl
at
F
u
rn
is
h
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
fu
ll
y
or
p
ar
tl
y
fu
rn
is
h
ed
Y
ea
r
Q
u
a
rt
er
A
ca
te
go
ri
ca
l
va
ri
ab
le
of
sa
le
ye
ar
an
d
q
u
ar
te
r,
20
13
Q
3
as
th
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
ye
ar
an
d
q
u
ar
te
r
E
P
C
A
−
E
P
C
G
B
in
ar
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
to
in
d
ic
at
e
th
e
E
P
C
R
at
in
g
of
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
(E
P
C
E
as
th
e
b
as
el
in
e,
E
P
C
N
as
m
is
si
n
g
E
P
C
ra
ti
n
g
)
B
re
a
k
2
01
4Q
3
A
b
in
ar
y
va
ri
a
b
le
to
in
d
ic
at
e
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
re
n
te
d
d
u
ri
n
g
&
af
te
r
20
14
Q
3
25
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables for private residential leases rental data from
ASPC during 2013Q3 to 2017Q3.
Variable Obs Mean or % Std. Dev. Min Max
Annual Rent 9531 9832.37 4017.18 3000 53400
Numpublic 13197 1.25 0.59 0 6
Numbedrooms 13197 2.21 1.06 0 7
Numbathrooms 13197 1.27 0.55 0 7
Heating 13197 86.82% 33.83% 0 1
Cloakrm 13197 11.93% 32.42% 0 1
Garage 13197 21.32% 40.96% 0 1
Garden 13197 45.03% 49.75% 0 1
Parking 13197 65.12% 47.66% 0 1
Newbuild 13197 1.20% 10.91% 0 1
TOM 12282 8.22 14.53 0 614.29
Furnish 13197 60.19% 48.95% 0 1
DetaSing 13197 4.83% 21.45% 0 1
DetaMulti 13197 11.84% 32.30% 0 1
NondeSing 13197 3.64% 18.72% 0 1
NondeMulti 13197 14.98% 35.69% 0 1
FlatGround 13197 21.44% 41.04% 0 1
FlatMid 13197 28.56% 45.17% 0 1
FlatTop 13197 12.11% 32.62% 0 1
2013Q3 12282 4.40% 20.50% 0 1
2013Q4 12282 3.62% 18.69% 0 1
2014Q1 12282 3.73% 18.95% 0 1
2014Q2 12282 3.82% 19.17% 0 1
2014Q3 12282 4.35% 20.39% 0 1
2014Q4 12282 2.12% 14.40% 0 1
2015Q1 12282 3.49% 18.36% 0 1
2015Q2 12282 5.07% 21.94% 0 1
2015Q3 12282 7.25% 25.93% 0 1
2015Q4 12282 7.44% 26.25% 0 1
2016Q1 12282 8.44% 27.79% 0 1
2016Q2 12282 8.42% 27.77% 0 1
2016Q3 12282 10.93% 31.21% 0 1
2016Q4 12282 8.33% 27.63% 0 1
2017Q1 12282 8.52% 27.93% 0 1
2017Q2 12282 9.30% 29.04% 0 1
2017Q3 12282 0.77% 8.76% 0 1
EPC A 13197 0.04% 1.95% 0 1
EPC B 13197 6.98% 25.48% 0 1
EPC C 13197 35.07% 47.72% 0 1
EPC D 13197 33.14% 47.07% 0 1
EPC E 13197 15.37% 36.07% 0 1
EPC F 13197 6.75% 25.09% 0 1
EPC G 13197 1.93% 13.77% 0 1
EPC N* 13197 0.72% 8.45% 0 1
Latitude 13196 57.1689 0.1878 51.0132 57.7046
Longitude 13196 -2.2029 0.1993 -3.4014 -0.9434
Break 2014Q3 13197 85.51% 35.20% 0 1
∗ EPC N denotes EPC rating is missing
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Table 3: Hedonic regression results of four forms in Eq. 2, 3, 4 for private residential
leases rental data from ASPC during 2013Q3 to 2017Q3, part I.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Heating 0.0601*** 0.0500*** 0.0333*** 0.0296***
(11.90) (9.71) (2.60) (2.79)
Cloakrm 0.0413*** 0.0344*** 0.0515*** 0.0561***
(6.61) (5.49) (3.43) (4.16)
Garage 0.0222*** 0.0225*** 0.0374*** 0.0430***
(4.27) (4.33) (2.97) (3.86)
Garden 0.0239*** 0.0265*** 0.0279** 0.0239**
(5.28) (5.82) (2.51) (2.56)
Parking 0.0517*** 0.0427*** 0.0395*** 0.0297***
(13.77) (11.08) (4.53) (3.99)
Newbuild 0.121*** 0.0845*** 0.0563* 0.0438
(8.58) (5.84) (1.69) (1.63)
TOM 0.000733*** 0.000950*** 0.00150 -0.00192
(2.80) (3.34) (0.25) (-0.39)
Furnish 0.0395*** 0.0391*** 0.0923*** 0.0845***
(9.35) (9.29) (10.47) (11.36)
DetaSing -0.000314 0.0107 -0.00107 -0.00233
(-0.04) (1.27) (-0.06) (-0.14)
DetaMulti -0.0169** -0.0108 -0.0250 -0.00245
(-2.24) (-1.43) (-1.40) (-0.15)
NondeSing 0.0297*** 0.0314*** -0.00592 0.00513
(3.31) (3.52) (-0.29) (0.29)
FlatGround -0.0111* -0.0155** 0.0276* 0.00712
(-1.77) (-2.47) (1.83) (0.55)
FlatMid -0.00554 -0.0175*** 0.0333** 0.0170
(-0.89) (-2.80) (2.18) (1.31)
FlatTop -0.0213*** -0.0236*** 0.0302* 0.0194
(-2.88) (-3.20) (1.69) (1.30)
EPC AB 0.0796*** 0.110*** 0.0750***
(9.60) (5.59) (4.73)
EPC C 0.0160*** 0.0347*** 0.0402***
(3.00) (2.75) (3.91)
EPC D 0.00767 0.0291** 0.0300***
(1.51) (2.44) (3.10)
EPC F -0.00687 -0.0266 -0.0267*
(-0.91) (-1.58) (-1.88)
EPC G -0.0723*** -0.0695** -0.0684***
(-5.59) (-2.44) (-2.81)
α 8.637*** 8.671*** 8.531*** 8.682***
(75.60) (74.11) (33.49) (34.13)
Year Quarter Vars
√ √ √ √
Coordinates Vars
√ √ √ √
Multilevel 2-level
√
Interactive 2014Q3
√ √
Observations 9530 9461 9461 9451
R squared 79.51% 79.94% 80.75% 81.09%(1),82.80%(2)
Random Effect Parameters
Level 1 property σ 0.1097***
Level 2 postcode σ 0.1184***
Likelihood ratio χ2 2194.55***
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
R2 for 2-level regression is Snijders/Bosker R-squared.
Bryk/Raudenbush R-squared for 2-level regression is 67.48% for level 1, and 86.09% for level 2.
27
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Table 4: Continues from previous page of Table 3, hedonic regression results of four forms
in Eq. 2, 3, 4 for private residential leases rental data from ASPC during 2013Q3 to
2017Q3, part II.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Numpublic1 0.0756*** 0.0630** 0.0502 0.0644*
Numpublic2 0.130*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.120***
Numpublic3 0.210*** 0.201*** 0.259*** 0.241***
Numpublic4 0.293*** 0.288*** 0.263*** 0.264***
Numpublic5 0.372*** 0.367*** 0.827*** 0.769***
Numbedrooms1 0.281*** 0.256*** 0.267*** 0.206***
Numbedrooms2 0.534*** 0.507*** 0.544*** 0.464***
Numbedrooms3 0.689*** 0.665*** 0.722*** 0.640***
Numbedrooms4 0.807*** 0.786*** 0.890*** 0.817***
Numbedrooms5 0.925*** 0.902*** 1.015*** 0.962***
Numbedrooms6 1.066*** 1.042*** 1.362*** 1.202***
Numbedrooms7 0.966*** 0.941*** 1.132*** 1.074***
Numbathrooms1 -0.0573 -0.0469 0.0455 -0.0123
Numbathrooms2 0.0852 0.0840 0.189* 0.100
Numbathrooms3 0.140 0.134 0.231** 0.190**
Numbathrooms4 0.256*** 0.249*** 0.218 0.107
Numbathrooms5 0.322*** 0.325*** 0.220 0.252
Numbathrooms6 0.139 0.126 0.154 0.115
2013Q3 -0.0494*** -0.0458*** -0.156 -0.142
2013Q4 -0.0627*** -0.0630*** -0.175 -0.147
2014Q1 -0.0657*** -0.0691*** -0.177 -0.147
2014Q2 -0.0194* -0.0216** -0.136 -0.116
2014Q4 -0.0261** -0.0237* -0.0275** -0.0218**
2015Q1 -0.0286*** -0.0296*** -0.0334*** -0.0350***
2015Q2 -0.0476*** -0.0517*** -0.0531*** -0.0512***
2015Q3 -0.0718*** -0.0732*** -0.0726*** -0.0690***
2015Q4 -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.150*** -0.147***
2016Q1 -0.203*** -0.204*** -0.205*** -0.204***
2016Q2 -0.224*** -0.226*** -0.228*** -0.232***
2016Q3 -0.253*** -0.255*** -0.256*** -0.256***
2016Q4 -0.290*** -0.293*** -0.296*** -0.301***
2017Q1 -0.324*** -0.327*** -0.328*** -0.328***
2017Q2 -0.306*** -0.309*** -0.312*** -0.316***
2017Q3 -0.292*** -0.295*** -0.297*** -0.319***
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
28
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Table 5: Continues from previous two pages of Table 3, hedonic regression results of four
forms in Eq. 2, 3, 4 for private residential leases rental data from ASPC during 2013Q3
to 2017Q3, part III.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Break×Numpublic1 0.0189 -0.0328
Break×Numpublic2 0.00458 -0.0485
Break×Numpublic3 -0.0690 -0.115**
Break×Numpublic4 0.0320 -0.0531
Break×Numpublic5 -0.556*** -0.588***
Break×Numbedrooms1 0.244 0.257
Break×Numbedrooms2 0.210 0.225
Break×Numbedrooms3 0.183 0.211
Break×Numbedrooms4 0.123 0.160
Break×Numbedrooms5 0.105 0.122
Break×Numbedrooms6 -0.152 0.0259
Break×Numbathrooms1 -0.226 -0.168
Break×Numbathrooms2 -0.236 -0.197
Break×Numbathrooms3 -0.218 -0.213
Break×Numbathrooms4 -0.0652 0.0152
Break×Heating 0.0202 0.00764
Break×Cloakrm -0.0188 -0.0145
Break×Garage -0.0204 -0.0259**
Break×Garden -0.00166 0.00456
Break×Parking 0.00161 -0.00433
Break×Newbuild 0.0358 0.00963
Break×Furnish -0.0678*** -0.0631***
Break×DetaSing 0.0162 0.0312*
Break×DetaMulti 0.0170 0.0244
Break×NondeSing 0.0487** 0.0354*
Break×FlatGround -0.0540*** -0.0454***
Break×FlatMid -0.0626*** -0.0495***
Break×FlatTop -0.0662*** -0.0544***
Break×EPC AB -0.0389* -0.0296*
(-1.80) (-1.74)
Break×EPC C -0.0227 -0.0195*
(-1.64) (-1.77)
Break×EPC D -0.0251* -0.0160*
(-1.91) (-1.65)
Break×EPC F 0.0277 0.0244
(1.47) (1.59)
Break×EPC G -0.00591 -0.0138
(-0.19) (-0.53)
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Appendix A. Robustness Check
We also utilise spatial autoregressive model (Anselin, 1998; LeSage and
Pace, 2010) to account for the decaying influence of recent transaction with
distance. The spatial autoregressive model (Model 6) is defined as Eq.A.1:
log(Pricei) = αi+ρWi,j log(Pricej)t−h+βXi+δEPCi+τ [Break×Xi]+η[Break×EPCi]+i ,
(A.1)
where Wi,j is the spatial weighting matrix (usually a first-order contiguity
matrix) between property i and j and i 6= j, ρ is the coefficient of spatially
lagged dependent variable, and h is the number of lags. We generate the spa-
tial weight matrices using k-nearest neighbor weight, radial distance, power
distance, exponential distance, and double-power distance approach, based
on the Haversine distance matrix computed from the latitude and longitude
of each property. We choose k-nearest neighbor weight over others for pro-
viding the highest explanatory power.
Fuerst and McAllister (2011a) and Eichholtz et al. (2010) find the re-
sults of regression procedure can be sensitive to the outliers caused by faulty
data, i.e. some prices or rents may appear to be too low/high to be re-
garded as regular free market transactions. In the presence of such outliers
in the estimation, the coefficients of EPC rating might be estimated with
bias. Following Fuerst and McAllister (2011a), we also implement the ro-
bust regression approach using Huber and Turkey biweights to mitigate the
potential error introduced by the outliers on coefficients estimates.
The outliers are identified using Cook’s distance to capture the impact
of dropping an observation based on its residual and its distance from the
mean (called leverage). If an observation has Cook’s distance large than 1, it
will be dropped for regression. This iterative algorithm process stops when
the maximum changes between the weights from one to the next is below
tolerance. According to Verardi and Croux (2009), M-estimator from robust
regression is adequately efficient, and can be found via
N∑
i=1
ψ
(
Y −Xβˆ
)
σ
X = 0 (A.2)
where ψ is the first derivative of the objective function of ρ(ε), which takes
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the form of a Huber function
ρ() =
{
1/22, if  6 k
k|| − 1/22, if  > k. (A.3)
And a Turkey Biweight function
ρ() =
{
1− (1− (/p)2)3 , if  6 p
1, if  > p.
(A.4)
Parameter k and p determines the Gaussian efficiency of the estimator.
By applying the two forms of weighting functions, the most influential
outliers are dropped, and then cases with large absolute residuals are down-
weighted.
Both results from spatial autoregressive model and robust regression
model are available from the authors upon request.
One could argue to allow precise control for location, distance from a
dwelling to a public park, public facilities, bus stop, etc., should be included.
We follow Jackson (1979) and Bracke (2015) and use the spatial polynomial
function because traditional accessibility measures mentioned above are likely
to provide disappointing results due to the interactions of complex forces in
the determination the accessibility of any location (Jackson, 1979). To test
the robustness of our models, we run all four models without geocodes related
variables to see if omitting these variables would change the coefficients of
EPCs and other key characteristics of the model. The results are shown in
Table A.6. It suggests that if we allow random effects at postcodes level (as
a control for neighbourhood as well as age), the coefficients EPC ratings and
other housing characteristics do not change significantly.
To further test the sensitivity of EPC ratings among larger properties, we
introduced a further dummy variable - large, to represent properties with four
or more bedrooms. We then included EPC interacted with large properties
in model 3 and 4. Coefficients of the key variables are presented in Table
A.7.
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Table A.6: Hedonic regression results of four forms in Eq. 2, 3, 4 for private residential
leases rental data from ASPC during 2013Q3 to 2017Q3, without geocode.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Heating 0.0581*** 0.0390*** 0.0254 0.0300***
(9.07) (5.97) (1.55) (2.71)
Cloakrm 0.0765*** 0.0625*** 0.0645*** 0.0697***
(9.73) (7.90) (3.37) (4.65)
Garage 0.0525*** 0.0493*** 0.0683*** 0.0488***
(8.06) (7.58) (4.26) (4.03)
Garden 0.0107* 0.0140** 0.00571 0.0129
(1.87) (2.43) (0.40) (1.31)
Parking 0.0702*** 0.0569*** 0.0619*** 0.0309***
(14.93) (11.80) (5.57) (3.89)
Newbuild 0.132*** 0.0951*** 0.0713* 0.0342
(7.34) (5.18) (1.68) (1.23)
TOM 0.00117*** 0.00147*** 0.000253 -0.00326
(3.51) (4.10) (0.03) (-0.63)
Furnish 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.188*** 0.116***
(31.23) (30.98) (16.99) (14.83)
DetaSing -0.0558*** -0.0403*** -0.0609** -0.0505***
(-5.34) (-3.85) (-2.55) (-2.62)
DetaMulti -0.0666*** -0.0547*** -0.0873*** -0.0294
(-7.07) (-5.80) (-3.84) (-1.61)
NondeSing 0.00848 0.00765 0.00774 -0.000646
(0.75) (0.68) (0.30) (-0.03)
FlatGround 0.0589*** 0.0477*** 0.101*** 0.0395***
(7.57) (6.12) (5.28) (2.88)
FlatMid 0.0645*** 0.0459*** 0.0960*** 0.0471***
(8.39) (5.91) (4.95) (3.40)
FlatTop 0.0679*** 0.0604*** 0.115*** 0.0564***
(7.39) (6.59) (5.06) (3.59)
EPC AB 0.107*** 0.135*** 0.0768***
(10.24) (5.37) (4.64)
EPC C 0.0492*** 0.0599*** 0.0531***
(7.33) (3.72) (4.84)
EPC D 0.0455*** 0.0654*** 0.0414***
(7.09) (4.31) (4.03)
EPC F -0.0156 -0.0548** -0.0379**
(-1.63) (-2.55) (-2.50)
EPC G -0.0813*** -0.0867** -0.0865***
(-5.00) (-2.38) (-3.32)
α 8.366*** 8.364*** 8.267*** 8.571***
(57.58) (56.29) (25.50) (25.52)
Year Quarter Vars
√ √ √ √
Coordinates Vars
Multilevel 2-level
√
Interactive 2014Q3
√ √
Observations 9530 9461 9461 9451
R squared 66.66% 67.45% 68.44% 64.20%(1),63.81%(2)
Random Effect Parameters
Level 1 property σ 0.1931***
Level 2 postcode σ 0.1101***
Likelihood ratio χ2 4372.48***
t-statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
R2 for 2-level regression is Snijders/Bosker R-squared.
Bryk/Raudenbush R-squared for 2-level regression is 67.31% for level 1, and 63.06% for level 2.
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Table A.7: Hedonic regression results of four forms in Eq. 3, 4 for private residential leases
rental data from ASPC during 2013Q3 to 2017Q3, with Large variable included.
Model 3 Model 4
Heating 0.0250 0.0300***
(1.53) (2.71)
Cloakrm 0.0647*** 0.0682***
(3.38) (4.53)
Garage 0.0684*** 0.0487***
(4.27) (4.02)
Garden 0.00584 0.0127
(0.41) (1.29)
Parking 0.0615*** 0.0306***
(5.53) (3.86)
Newbuild 0.0710* 0.0343
(1.67) (1.24)
TOM -0.0000287 -0.00322
(-0.00) (-0.63)
Furnish 0.189*** 0.116***
(17.01) (14.82)
DetaSing -0.0608** -0.0513***
(-2.54) (-2.65)
DetaMulti -0.0881*** -0.0317*
(-3.87) (-1.73)
NondeSing 0.00712 -0.00239
(0.28) (-0.12)
FlatGround 0.100*** 0.0382***
(5.24) (2.78)
FlatMid 0.0951*** 0.0462***
(4.90) (3.34)
FlatTop 0.114*** 0.0551***
(5.01) (3.51)
EPC AB 0.139*** 0.0756***
(5.49) (4.53)
EPC C 0.0621*** 0.0533***
(3.81) (4.81)
EPC D 0.0688*** 0.0445***
(4.48) (4.27)
EPC F -0.0486** -0.0357**
(-2.22) (-2.32)
EPC G -0.0831** -0.0821***
(-2.25) (-3.15)
Large×EPC B -0.0396 0.0335
(-1.20) (1.07)
Large×EPC C -0.0161 -0.000899
(-0.84) (-0.05)
Large×EPC D -0.0264 -0.0326*
(-1.38) (-1.78)
Large×EPC F -0.0432 -0.0234
(-1.64) (-0.89)
Large×EPC G -0.0297 -0.0874
(-0.55) (-1.51)
α 8.290*** 8.593***
(25.55) (25.55)
Year Quarter Vars
√ √
Coordinates Vars
√ √
Multilevel 2-level
√
Interactive 2014Q3
√ √
Observations 9461 9451
R squared 80.77% 81.08%(1),82.78%(2)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Highlights  
• Private tenants pay a premium for properties with higher energy performance. 
• The willingness to pay is considerable. 
• Such willingness to pay is significantly reduced during economic downturn. 
• The private housing sector may need public strategy to improve energy performance. 
